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Addressing the Class Claim
Conundrum with Online
Dispute Resolution
Amy J. Schmitz*
Consumers with similar claims in the United States (U.S.) often join forces to
launch representative, or “class,” actions. This allows them to obtain remedies
with little cost and effort and serves a “private attorney general” function by
bringing light to purchase problems that public enforcement offices may not have
the resources to address. This is especially important for lower dollar claims that
are too costly for each consumer to pursue individually.
Nonetheless, some have criticized class actions in the U.S. for forcing
settlements and padding the pockets of lawyers, while leaving consumers with
minimal pay–outs. At the same time, European consumers complain that the lack of
class action procedures in the European Union (E.U.) has diminished their access
to remedies for small dollar claims. Accordingly, there are complaints on both
sides; some view the “U.S. class action system” as abusive while others argue that
the E.U. should adopt a similar system in order to provide access to remedies
through mass claims.
This Article provides a brief comparison of U.S. versus E.U. law with respect
to class actions, noting how this dichotomy creates a “class action conundrum”
due to these actions’ vices and virtues. The Article then argues that in light of this
conundrum, it is time to consider innovations beyond class actions. The time is ripe
to renew consideration of a global online dispute resolution (“ODR”) process for
mass claims to promote consumer protection on a worldwide level.

I. INTRODUCTION
Consumers may suffer the same harms but enjoy different access to remedies
due to jurisdictional differences in laws and procedures for obtaining remedies. For
example, consumers in different parts of the world received different remedies with
respect to Volkswagen’s (“VW”) use of software in its diesel engines to manipulate
emission levels–also known as “Dieselgate.”1 In that case, VW intentionally
programmed turbocharged direct injection (“TDI”) diesel engines to activate their
emissions controls only during laboratory emissions testing.2 This manipulation
caused the vehicles’ nitrogen oxides (NOx) readings to meet United States and
* Elwood L. Thomas Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. I
thank Kelli Reichert for her research assistance, and all the contributors and commentators at the
Comparative Law Society meeting at the University of Missouri–Columbia.
1. Maria Juul, Lawsuit Triggered by the Volkswagen Emissions Case, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY
RESEARCH SERV. 1 (May 2016).
2. Jack Ewing, Ex–Volkswagen C.E.O. Charged with Fraud Over Diesel Emissions, N.Y. TIMES
(May 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/business/volkswagen-ceo-diesel-fraud.html; see
also Learn About Volkswagen Violations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/vw/learnabout-volkswagen-violations (last updated Sept. 27, 2019).
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European Union standards during testing, but emit up to forty times more NOx in
real–world driving.3 VW deployed this programming software in about eleven
million cars worldwide, including over 500,000 cars in the U.S.4
This manipulation caused financial and psychological injuries to consumers
who felt VW had betrayed them.5 Consumers who believed that they purchased
environmentally friendly cars were aghast when they learned they had purchased
vehicles that not only defied so–called “green” marketing and advertisements, but
were so “dirty” that it was illegal to drive them in the U.S. and the E.U.6 This news
destroyed the cars’ value and inflicted identity harm on consumers who suddenly
learned their cars were especially bad for the environment.7 It also sparked U.S.
government enforcement actions from many angles: Department of Justice,
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”),8 California Air Resources Board,
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), Customs and Border Protection, and state
Attorneys General.9
Dieselgate created a perfect storm of litigation in the U.S.10 Enforcement
actions gave way to class actions, as a reported 482,632 consumers submitted
claims with respect to VW 2–Liter vehicles alone.11 In the subsequent litigation,
373,623 of those owners and lessees resolved their disputes in consolidated class
actions, resulting in a total consumer payout of $7,830,065,930.03. Additionally,
VW either removed from commerce or properly modified approximately 93.4% of
the affected 2–Liter vehicles by the end of 2018.12 At the same time, 70,839 VW
consumers had submitted claims in the consolidated class litigation regarding 3–
Liter vehicles, resulting in 64,885 consumers accepting settlement offers totaling
$1,027,699,629.15.13 Meanwhile, enforcement actions and varied forms of
3. Juul, supra note 1, at 2; see also Ewing, supra note 2.
4. Juul, supra note 1, at 2; Learn About Volkswagen Violations, supra note 2; see also John C. Cruden
et al., Dieselgate: How the Investigation, Prosecution, and Settlement of Volkswagen’s Emissions
Cheating Scandal Illustrates the Need for Robust Environmental Enforcement, 36 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 118,
126 (2018).
5. Sarah Dadush, Identity Harm, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 865–68 (2018).
6. Id. at 889–91.
7. Id. at 891–92.
8. U.S. Files Complaint Against Volkswagen, Audi, & Porsche for Alleged Clean Air Act Violations,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-files-complaintagainst-volkswagen-audi-and-porsche-alleged-clean-air-act.
9. Learn About Volkswagen Violations, supra note 2; Volkswagen AG Pleads Guilty in Connection
with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-ag-pleads-guilty-connection-conspiracy-cheat-us-emission
s-tests; CBP Joins DOJ, FBI, & EPA in Announcing a Settlement Against Volkswagen as a Result of
Their Scheme to Cheat U.S. Emissions Test, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Jan. 12, 2017),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/spotlights/cbp-joins-doj-fbi-and-epa-announcing-settlement-againstvolkswagen-result-their.
10. See Nick Conger & Julia Valentine, Reference News Release: Volkswagen to Spend Up to $14.7
Billion to Settle Allegations of Cheating Emissions Tests & Deceiving Customers on 2.0 Liter Diesel
Vehicles, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (June 28, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/reference-new
s-release-volkswagen-spend-147-billion-settle-allegations-cheating.
11. Report of Indep. Claims Supervisor on Volkswagen’s Progress & Compliance Related to 2.0 Liter
Resolution Agreements Entered Oct. 25, 2016, Case No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB 1, 3 (Nov. 26, 2018),
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/crb/vwmdl/claims-reports.
12. Id. at 6. The terms of the settlement called for eighty–five percent to have been removed or
modified by May 1, 2018. Id.
13. Report of Indep. Claims Supervisor on Volkwagen’s Progress & Compliance Related to 3.0 Liter
Resolution Agreements 4, Case No. 3:15–md–02672–CRB (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.cand
.uscourts.gov/crb/vwmdl/claims-reports.
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litigation have brewed throughout the world, but European consumers claim
remedies have been slow and scant in most of the E.U., arguably due to lack of class
relief.14 Even in VW’s home country of Germany, many consumers are still in the
litigation line, waiting to get remedies.
This example shows how class actions can be an integral means for U.S.
consumers to obtain remedies in mass claims. This is especially true because they
allow individuals to obtain remedies without having to proactively litigate, making
it more cost–effective to pursue remedies on small–dollar claims. Furthermore,
class actions allow consumers to act as “private attorneys general” in bringing
lawsuits as a group to shed light on improprieties.15 Indeed, class relief has been
the primary means for U.S. consumers to pursue remedies in mass business–to–
consumer (“B2C”) transactions.
However, some have critiqued American class actions for padding the pockets
of lawyers while leaving consumers without full redress. This perception arises
because lawyers are usually able to obtain their attorney fees when representing
class actions. Furthermore, class actions have been diminished in the U.S. due to
the strict enforcement of pre–dispute arbitration clauses under the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”).16 In contrast, the E.U. has been more proactive in its
refusal or reluctance to enforce pre–dispute arbitration clauses in B2C contracts.17
Arguably, this makes it easier for individual consumers to assert their claims in
litigation, as they at least bypass the quandary that American consumers face when
forced to assert claims in costly and inconvenient arbitration procedures. European
consumers nonetheless lament their lack of access to class actions, as they often
must wait in line while seeking to pursue individual litigation. This has fuelled
proposals for class, or representative, actions in the E.U.
Meanwhile, online dispute resolution (“ODR”) systems are expanding access
to remedies in B2C purchases throughout the world. This ODR includes use of
technology and computer–mediated–communications (“CMC”) to assist dispute
resolution through means such as online negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. In
fact, the E.U. has adopted a Directive on Alternative Dispute Resolution for
Consumer Disputes (the “ADR Directive”)18 and a Regulation on Online Dispute
Resolution for Consumer Disputes (the “ODR Regulation”),19 which work in
tandem to require member states to implement ODR systems for consumer claims.

14. See Kevin Tarsa, Won’t Get Fooled Again: Why VW’s Emissions Deception is Illegal in Europe
and How to Improve the E.U.’s Auto Regulatory System, 40 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 315 (2017).
15. Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat: Qui Tam Actions as a State Response to Concepcion, 46
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1203, 1221 (2013).
16. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08, 301–07 (1970) (implementing the N.Y. Convention
under sections 201–08 and the Panama Convention under sections 301–07); Christopher R. Drahozal,
New Experiences of International Arbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 233–55
(2006) (noting how the U.S.’s strict enforcement of arbitration is distinct). J. Maria Glover,
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124
YALE L. J. 3052, 3070–84 (2015).
17. James R. Bucilla II, The Online Crossroads of Website Terms of Service Agreements and
Consumer Protection: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in the Terms of Service Agreements
for the Top 100 Websites Viewed in the United States, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 102, 133–49 (2014).
18. Council Directive 2013/11, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 63 (E.U.).
19. Commission Regulation 524/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 1 (E.U.).
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Furthermore, ODR projects in the courts are flourishing in the U.S. and throughout
the world.20
At the same time, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) spent many years advancing ODR for cross–border ecommerce
through its Working Group III on Online Dispute Resolution.21 While Working
Group III did not produce a treaty establishing a global ODR system, it ended in
2016 with a strong statement encouraging further developments toward a global
ODR mechanism for consumer claims.22 Technology has advanced considerably
since 2016, and the momentum to use ODR to expand access to justice is stronger
than ever.23
The need for ODR is especially robust where consumers suffer similar harms
throughout the world, but receive differential redress based on where they reside.
Therefore, it is high time to establish global ODR for consumer mass claims to help
shed light on consumer protection issues and provide equitable redress for all
consumers, regardless of where they live.24 The discussion need not myopically
focus on class actions when it comes to consumer remedies. Instead, ODR may
provide an additional means for accessing justice in consumer mass claims.
Accordingly, Section II of this Article will provide a brief snapshot of
consumer mass claims procedures in the U.S. and explain some of the debates
regarding class actions and arbitration clauses. Section III provides a glimpse into
the debate regarding representative actions under E.U. law. Next, Section IV
introduces ODR and suggest ideas for using ODR to bypass the class action debate
and allow for an additional, alternative mechanism for promoting fairness,
transparency, and efficiency while expanding consumers’ access to remedies with
respect to consumer mass claims. Section V will conclude.

II. PURSUING MASS CONSUMER
CLAIMS IN THE U.S.
In the U.S., public and private actions may work in concert to provide redress
for consumers while enjoining malfeasance and imposing fines or sanctions against
bad actors in the marketplace. Nonetheless, companies may continue to act
improperly without reproach where regulators do not have time or resources to
pursue them, or when a case is not sufficiently large or lucrative for class action
attorneys to take it on.25 Hence, the U.S. system works fairly well when regulators
and class action law firms invest in pursuing bad actors, but the system may fail
when cases never gain steam for economic or political reasons, or arbitration clauses
cut off access to class remedies. Furthermore, class actions have their own critics
due to high litigation costs and sometimes unsatisfying payouts.
20. Amy J. Schmitz, Expanding Access to Remedies through E–Court Initiatives, 67 BUFF. L. REV.
89, 91–92 (2019).
21. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law on the Work of Its Twenty–Ninth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.128 (2014).
22. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law on the Work of Its Thirty–Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/868 (2016).
23. See also AMY J. SCHMITZ & COLIN RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AND THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 27 (2017).
24. Id.
25. Sarah Dadush, Identity Harm, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 863–75 (2018) (noting how deceptive
trade practices can harm individuals emotionally as well as financially).
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A. Government Actions Based
on Statutory Claims
As Dieselgate illustrated, government agencies in the U.S. may act in concert
or alone under various laws to pursue companies that violate consumer protection
laws.26 Furthermore, when it comes to seeking redress for consumers’ typical B2C
claims, the FTC and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) are
paramount. The FTC is the primary federal agency to pursue enforcement actions
regarding “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared
unlawful.”27 A deceptive act includes “a representation, omission, or practice that
[is] likely to mislead a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the
consumer’s detriment.”28 The CFPB is the primary federal agency that enforces
laws and regulations related to consumer financial products and services.29 This
includes issues having to do with credit cards, and other lending products, that are
often problematic for low–income consumers who face significant difficulty in
affording court process.30
Other laws address illegal profits skimming, which occurs when
companies do not disclose their full income on tax returns.31 Additionally, U.S.
consumers may use the Magnuson–Moss Act for breach of warranty claims.32 The
Act establishes an implied warranty of merchantability and clear rules companies
must follow to disclaim or limit the warranty.33 Consumer laws also require that
companies adequately label their products, and that the products “pass without
objection in the trade as designed, manufactured, and marketed.”34
At the state level, consumers may also rely on their state unfair trade practices
statutes.35 In some situations, state Attorneys General also may bring suits on behalf
of the residents of their states.36 These actions allow for injunctions, civil penalties,
and public compensation.37 At the same time, state Attorneys General may join
together when they all have citizens with similar harms.38 For example, state
Attorneys General may seek to consolidate discovery and share resources where

26. Learn About Volkswagen Violations, supra note 2; Laws & Regulations related to Volkswagen
Violations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/vw/laws-and-regulations-relatedvolkswagen-violations (last visited Feb. 27, 2020).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018).
28. Sw. Sunsites, Inc. v. F.T.C., 785 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986).
29. Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then and Now, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 895, 904 (2015).
30. Id. at 904–05.
31. Georgia Couple Sentenced to Prison for Tax Fraud, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 7, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/georgia-couple-sentenced-prison-tax-fraud. A federal bill was
introduced, but not enacted, that would have focused upon skimming profits, the Equity Skimming
Prevention Act. Equity Skimming Prevention Act, S.B. 2462, 103d Cong. § 2 (1994).
32. Doebler v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am. (Oct. 7, 2015) (No. 1:15–cv–23753–PCH).
33. Id. at 15.
34. Id.
35. Consumer Protection in the States: Appendix B State–by–State Summaries of State UDAP
Statutes, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. (Jan. 10, 2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/analysisstate-summaries.pdf.
36. Elysa Dishman, Class Action Squared: Multistate Actions and Agency Dilemmas, SSRN 8 (Sept.
19, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3252149.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 13.
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their claims are essentially identical.39 Still, these actions cause some controversy
where it appears that larger and more powerful states gain the upper hand. 40
Nonetheless, government actions do not take the place of private class actions
in the U.S. Instead, multiple actions may coexist in the U.S. In United States v.
Kordel, for example, the court held that a governmental agency does not have to
choose one course of proceedings, meaning an agency is free to bring both civil and
criminal proceedings at a single point in time.41 Accordingly, it was appropriate in
the Dielselgate situation for the EPA to seek both criminal and civil penalties
against VW at the same time.42

B. Class Actions
Many may assume that class actions are a new phenomenon. To the contrary,
the idea of representative actions actually originated in old common law under the
auspices of “bills of peace.”43 These “bills of peace” allowed a representative to
bring or defend a suit on behalf of a group of individuals to promote judicial
economy and fair redress.44 Like bills of peace, modern class actions aim to
efficiently compensate victims.45 They also serve a “private attorney general
function” by allowing individuals to lead group actions that shed light on purchase
problems and make it possible for individuals to obtain redress in small dollar cases
that would not be worth the cost or effort to pursue on an individual basis.
These ideas are at the foundation of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”) 23, which formalizes the procedure for the formation of class, or
representative, actions.46 Furthermore, FRCP 23 was amended in 1966 to shift the
procedure from “opt–out” to an “opt–in” default, meaning that individuals now
must proactively opt out of a class action to avoid being a member.47 FRCP Rule
23(c)(2) places the burden on the petitioner to provide notice for the class action. 48
FRCP 23 also provides for liberal funding schemes to ease difficulties of
obtaining counsel in such cases. First, the rules provide for a “common funding
mechanism.”49 This requires all beneficiaries of a class action to contribute to a
common fund for maintaining a class action.50 Second, class action rules allow for
a shift in the usual U.S. rule requiring parties to pay their own legal fees51; this
means that state or federal laws may permit plaintiffs in class actions to recover
39. Id. at 16.
40. Id. at 22.
41. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1970).
42. United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1049 (2008).
43. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Distant Mirror: The Bill of Peace in Early American Mass Torts and Its
Implications for Modern Class Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 712 (1997).
44. Id.
45. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 399–418 (2014).
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
47. Scott Dodson, Article: An Opt–In Option for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 171, 179 (2016).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (c)(2).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment).
50. Id.
51. Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States,
Presentation at Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective 11, Paper Presented at the
Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective Conference, Geneva, Switzerland (July 21–
22, 2000), https://law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf.
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attorney fees from the defendant if their suit is successful.52 At the same time, it is
common in the U.S. for attorneys to take on class actions using a contingency fee.
In other words, attorneys get paid a percentage of the eventual award or settlement,
and lead plaintiffs often invest little to nothing in filing a class action.
Companies in the U.S. generally dislike class actions and lament their power
to allegedly “extort” large settlements.53 They complain that defendants have no
analogous “loser pays” right if their defense is successful, meaning that plaintiffs
with arguably baseless claims are never left paying defendants’ attorney fees.54
Companies complain the contingency fee model sparks attorneys to instigate class
claims, even when consumers do not feel harmed or aggrieved.55 Additionally,
complex class–certification rules and confusing jurisprudence regarding class
procedures have hindered the efficiency and deterrence goals of class actions.56
Conflicts of interest between class attorneys and class members threaten the
prospect that class members will actually receive the relief they deserve.57 Attorney
fees and litigation costs may deplete class awards and settlements, leaving little to
compensate individual claimants.58 Furthermore, attorneys may shy away from
cases involving many claimants with small claims because the costs of providing
notice and administering claims may exhaust any eventual settlement available to
pay the attorneys.59 Moreover, some class attorneys increase these risks of depleted
class resources by raising their fees during the litigation process.60
Despite these criticisms, class actions remain a primary vehicle for consumers
to obtain relief with respect to mass claims. Indeed, it may be the only efficient
means for obtaining relief in small dollar claims where the cost of individually
pursuing the claims would exceed any likely payout. Furthermore, class actions do
play an important role in shedding light on corporate improprieties. Class actions
in the U.S. also benefit from rules requiring courts to give full faith and credit to the
judgements of other states under the U.S. Constitution.61 Additionally, federal
courts must give state judgments full faith and credit.62

52. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part II: Litigation and Legitimacy, 1981–
1994, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1792 (2018).
53. Russell M. Gold, Compensation’s Role in Deterrence, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1997, 2018–19
(2016).
54. Id. at 2041 (explaining that plaintiffs may be sanctioned if a claim does not pass “Rule 11” muster
and is deemed wholly frivolous); see also Shay Lavie, The Malleability of Collective Litigation, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 697, 710 (2012).
55. Gold, supra note 53, at 2002.
56. Mullinex, supra note 45, at 419 (explaining how class notices may disclose the total amount
received through settlement but provide no information about payment of individual claims).
57. George Rutherglen, Wal–Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the Deterrent Class Action, 98
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24, 26 (2012).
58. Id. at 24–27.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016) (explaining that the Full Faith and Credit Clause “requires
each state to recognize and give effect to valid judgments rendered by the courts of its sister States.”).
62. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982).
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C. Contractually Required
Arbitration in the U.S.
Despite the “hype” around class actions in the U.S., their power is diminishing
in the wake of arbitration clauses.63 Indeed, no discussion regarding class actions
is complete without a note regarding pre–dispute arbitration clauses.64 This is
because many businesses insist upon arbitration clauses with class action waivers
in all of their consumer contracts to maintain privacy of claims, save litigation costs,
and preclude what can be a public relations nightmare with class claims. 65 For
example, VW sought to preclude consumers’ claims based on arbitration clauses in
their purchase agreements with the dealerships.66 The problem for VW, however,
was that it was not a party to the dealership agreements containing the arbitration
clauses. Nonetheless, VW would have been able to preclude class actions with the
consumers where it was a direct party to the contracts containing the arbitration
clauses.67
The presence of arbitration clauses is important in the U.S. because the U.S.
Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to
require strict enforcement of pre–dispute arbitration clauses in B2C contracts.68
This is true even when statutory claims are at stake.69 Courts in the U.S. also
construe arbitration clauses broadly to cover tort and statutory claims regardless of
whether a clause gives express notice of such coverage.70 Additionally, consumers
must overcome a high burden to show that arbitration costs effectively prohibit
claimants from vindicating their statutory rights.71

63. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161 (2015) (finding that
recent Supreme Court holdings authorize businesses to include class action waivers along with
arbitration clauses).
64. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 290–91 (2015)
(providing a history of the expansion of arbitration clauses); see also Lavie, supra note 54, at 705–09
(demonstrating how business can “cherry–pick” plaintiffs in class action suits by settling with stronger
plaintiffs).
65. Fitzpatrick, supra note, at 164–97; see also Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The
Forthcoming, Near–Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 406–08 (2005).
66. Order In re: Volkswagen Timing Chain Product Liability Litigation (No. 2:16–cv–02765) (May
8, 2017) (denying enforcement of an arbitration clause to preclude a lawsuit against VW).
67. Beasley Allen, Judge Denies VW Arbitration Bid in Engine Defect Suit, JERE BEASLEY REPORT
(June 9, 2017), http://www.jerebeasleyreport.com/2017/06/judge-denies-vw-arbitration-bid-enginedefect-suit/.
68. See AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 334–59 (2011); see also Stolt–Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); Rent–A–Ctr, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63,
68–74 (2010).
69. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1989) (overruling
prior opinion to hold securities claims arbitrable); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89–
92 (2000) (finding TILA claims may be subject to binding arbitration under the FAA).
70. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24–26 (1991) (finding statutory age
discrimination statute could be subject to arbitration).
71. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S., 91–92 (200) (finding that although Randolph had
provided information regarding high AAA arbitration fees and costs, he still had not overcome his burden
of proof); American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 233–34 (2013) (emphasizing
there is no right to economical means for asserting anti–trust claims).
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It is also important to note that class arbitration is rare–to–non–existent in the
wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds
International Corp.72 In that case, the Court held that arbitrators exceeded their
authority in ordering class arbitration where the contract between shipping
companies and their customers was silent on class relief.73 Nonetheless, most
consumer contracts expressly preclude class proceedings, and it is very difficult to
challenge class waivers following the decision in AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v.
Concepcion.74 The Supreme Court held that the FAA pre–empts a state court from
using unconscionability to essentially safeguard a right to bring class actions or
class–wide arbitration.75 Moreover, the CFPB had approved a final rule precluding
the enforcement of pre–dispute arbitration clauses in consumer financial products
and services agreements where they would stop class actions, but the current
administration essentially shut down the rule.76
In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s application of the FAA, Annex 1[q] of
the E.U. Directive 13/93 makes pre–dispute arbitration clauses “prima facie”
invalid.77 Furthermore, the E.U. ADR Directive states that nationally certified
ADR/ODR entities cannot use pre–dispute arbitration clauses.78 Additionally, the
European Court of Justice ruled in Mostaza Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium that
courts should closely examine arbitration clauses in B2C contracts to ensure that
they are fair, especially where their enforcement would effectively cut off a
consumers’ access to redress.79
This contrasting law on arbitration highlights the importance of providing
consumers with accessible means for obtaining remedies.80 Sadly, arbitration
clauses often prevent consumers from pursuing claims and let companies “off the
hook” for wrongdoing.81 Despite this reality, legal economists often argue that
arbitration clauses are ultimately “good” for all consumers because companies pass
on savings from arbitration to consumers through lower prices and better products
and services.82 However, there is no empirical proof of this assumption and, as
noted above, class actions shed light on product defects, initiate recalls, and inform
72. Stolt–Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 662.
73. Id. at 673–87. But see Oxford Health Plans L.L.C. v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 564–73 (2013)
(refusing to void class arbitration order).
74. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1, 38 (“Of
the arbitration clauses in the sample [of credit card agreements], forty–four of forty–seven clauses (or
93.6%) (covering 99.9% of the credit card loans outstanding) waived any right to class arbitration.”).
75. AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743–56 (2011).
76. CFPB Issues Rule to Ban Consumers from Using Arbitration Clauses to Deny Groups of People
Their Day in Court, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (updated Nov. 22, 2017, after the rule was reversed),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-rule-ban-companies-using-arbitrati
on-clauses-deny-groups-people-their-day-court/.
77. Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 34 (EEC).
78. Council Directive 2013/11, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 63–79 (E.U.).
79. C–168/05, Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium, 2006 E.C.R. I–10421.
80. With the growth of mandatory arbitration clauses, businesses have gained quasi–lawmaking
powers that significantly decrease the compensatory and public deterrent objectives of consumer
protection laws. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 125 YALE
L.J. 3052 (2015).
81. Aaron Blumenthal, Circumventing Concepcion: Conceptualizing Innovative Strategies to Ensure
the Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws in the Age of the Inviolable Class Action Waiver, 103
CAL. L. REV. 699, 700–14 (2015).
82. See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements with Particular
Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 254–64, 292 (2006).
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other consumers about purchase problems.83 They also allow individuals to assert
small dollar claims in an economical manner.84 Accordingly, class actions play an
important role in a consumer protection scheme.
That is not to say that class actions are ideal.85 As noted above, class actions
have their critics. Accordingly, this Article suggests ideas for adding a new online
mechanism for pursuing mass claims–Online Dispute Resolution (“ODR”).
Furthermore, the ODR process coupled with a “trip wire” for mass claims could
help even the playing field and allow for consumers with similar harms to receive
similar compensation, regardless of their zip code. This would also aid regulators
in coordinating their efforts to stop mass deception such as what we saw in the
Dieselgate case.86

III. CLASS ACTION DEBATES
IN EUROPE
Each Member State in the E.U. may have some form of representative action,
although American style “class actions” are fairly rare in Europe overall.
Nonetheless, this Section is merely looking at the E.U. Directives and Proposals
related to allowance for consumer representative, or class, actions. It will not
attempt to tackle the details of the individual Member States’ laws, as that would
take volumes. Suffice it to say, however, that “class action” debates regarding
representative actions have hit a high note recently in the wake of Dieselgate
because many Europeans questioned why U.S. VW consumers seemed to obtain
redress much more quickly than their European counterparts. Indeed, consumers in
Germany, where VW is based, seem to be stuck in a litigation line—many still
waiting for redress.

A. Injunctive Actions and Disjointed
Member State Processes
European law generally does not have the same sort of “class actions” as exist
under U.S. law. Instead, E.U. Directive 2009/22/EC, or the Injunctions Directive,
allows for representative actions that call for injunctive relief.87 In particular, the
Directive allows for either “one or more public bodies specifically responsible for
protecting [consumers’] interests,” or an organization whose purpose it is to protect
those interests, to bring an injunction against any “infringement” that goes against
consumers’ collective interests.88

83. Id. at 259–62.
84. See Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumers’ Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 635–45 (2008) (discussing functions of class actions).
85. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L. J. 399 (2014) (concluding that “[t]he class action rule is not a bad
thing; it is just not working, or it is working poorly.”).
86. Cruden et. al., supra note 4, at 120–25.
87. Council Directive 2009/22, 2009 O.J. (L110) (EC).
88. Id.
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Accordingly, a consumer protection agency could bring an action seeking to
stop a company from continuing to engage in deceptive practices. This is similar
to the FTC enforcement actions in the U.S. where the FTC merely seeks to enjoin a
company from selling defective goods, lying to consumers, or the like. However,
the Directive has been criticized for failing to allow for representative actions for
money damages. Indeed, injunctive relief can be quite disappointing for consumers
who have already suffered financial harm and are not able to expend the time and
cost to individually pursue litigation. This disappointment has led to Proposals for
a new collective redress mechanism.89
This is especially true as Member States have practiced a limited and
problematic patchwork of procedures. As an initial matter, most of the Member
States only allow for collective action in cases where collective action is obviously
needed, such as cases per the “leapfrogging” principle extending to various sectors
of the European legal systems.90
The chart on the next page aims to encapsulate the areas where different
Member States allow for collective action.

89. Philippe Métais & Elodie Valette, Collective Redress In the E.U.: Past, Present, & Future, LAW
360 EXPERT ANALYSIS (Mar. 22, 2019) https://www.law360.com/articles/1141551/collective-redressin-the-eu-past-present-and-future; Philippe Métais & Elodie Valette, One Step Closer to Group Actions
(Collective Redress) in the E.U., WHITE CASE ALERT (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.whitecase.com/publi
cations/alert/one-step-closer-group-actions-collective-redress-eu.
90. Csongor István Nagy, Collective Actions in Europe: A Comparative, Economic and Transsystemic
Analysis, SSRN 71, 85 (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3440551.
91. Id. at 85–100. This chart was created by University of Missouri Law School student Kelli Reichert,
based on the cited book. Special thank you and acknowledgment to Kelli Reichert for her fine work.
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This chart depicts differences in coverage. At the same time, there are different
requirements for class certification, and standing rules vary among Member States.
This can include public entities, non–profit organizations, Member representatives,

92. Consumer Protection described using terminology other than “consumer protection”: Consumer
matters (Finland), Actions under the consumer code (Italy), securities (Slovenia), Code of economic law,
enterprise breaches and contractual obligations, banking, insurance, credit card and payment services
(Belgium). Id. at 84–87.
93. Id. at 85.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Nagy, supra note 90, at 86.
97. Id. (while Spain’s Class Actions are limited to consumer protection, there is a section that includes
matters pertaining to the equal treatment between men and women).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 87.
102. Nagy, supra note 90, at 87.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 88.
108. Nagy, supra note 90, at 88.
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SMEs, and more–again, depending on the Member State.109 The Member States
also have varied laws with respect to funding and liability for legal costs for
collective actions. Rules differ among the Member States on whether the system is
“opt–in” or “opt–out” such that those following an opt–in system tend to only bind
the parties who joined in the action.110 However, in Italy, those who did not opt in,
while not bound, are typically precluded from future collective actions on the same
subject.111 So, they may still assert their claim as an individual, but not in a
collective action.112 Those who use an opt–out system apply res judicata to group
members who do not opt–out.113 This is like the U.S. system.

B. European Proposal for
Representative Actions
Accordingly, the E.U. Member States follow a wide variety of rules regarding
collective redress, and no one mechanism has emerged, which proved to be
problematic in Dieselgate. Indeed, debates regarding collective action for pursuing
consumer claims have loomed large in Europe.114 The E.U. has been progressive
in passing consumer protection legislation and curbing pre–dispute arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts, as noted above. However, the E.U. has been highly
skeptical of the “U.S. style” class action.115
In 2013, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation of Collective
Redress that directed Member States to adopt a collective redress mechanism for
violations of E.U. laws, but it lacked teeth and was careful to curb who could launch
class actions.116 Accordingly, the Recommendation was not binding and limited
who would qualify to bring representative actions to non–profit entities or public
authorities.117 The Recommendation also suggested a “loser pays” system that
excludes contingency fees.118 The idea was to preclude birth of “class action law
firms” that have become notorious in the U.S. for reaping large contingency fees
per their “pets” on large–scale claims against “deep–pocket” companies.119
Over time, however, there seem to be renewed calls for changes that would
allow for more robust collective redress in the E.U. To that end, the European
Commission is considering a Proposal for a Directive on representative actions that
would repeal the former directive in order to expand its scope and allow for financial
redress.120 The Proposal aims to further goals of the 2017 Fitness Check on the

109. Id. at 95–98.
110. Id. at 100–01.
111. Id. at 101.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 102.
114. Linklaters LLP, Collective Redress within the European Union (May 1, 2019), https://www.link
laters.com/en-us/insights/publications/collective-redress-2018/collective-redress-across-the-globe-201
8/eu.
115. See, e.g., Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. INT’L L.
J. 141, 141–42 (2010).
116. NAGY, supra note 90, at 71.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 72.
119. Id. at 72–100 (see the charts and variety of systems in the book available online).
120. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Representative Actions for the Protection of the Collective Interests of Consumers, and Repealing, at 1,
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Injunctions Directive, which evaluated its effectiveness and addressed
shortcomings of the Injunctions Directive. The Commission found that the
Directive was not being used due to its complexity, cost, and the limited results that
it could get for affected consumers.121 The Proposal aims to add “teeth” to the
Injunctions Directive by allowing for financial compensation and expanding
coverage to include other economic sectors where “a trader’s illegal practices may
affect a large number of consumers.”122 Nonetheless, the Proposal seeks to prevent
“abusive litigation” by limiting the “qualified entities” that can bring these
representative actions.123
Specifically, the Proposal seems to “take a page” from U.S. class action
procedures in that it would allow for representative actions to obtain compensation,
in addition to obtaining an injunction to stop or prohibit an infringement against the
collective interests of consumers.124 For example, the Proposal would allow a
“qualified entity” to act on behalf of a group of consumers in France to obtain
compensatory and injunctive relief against a company in Belgium engaging in
deceptive trade practices.125 Put another way, a qualified entity could bring an
action against VW in Germany on behalf of consumers in Spain.
The Proposal would nonetheless limit who could bring these claims, which is
a measure aimed to curb what some see as the abusive class action law firms in the
U.S. The criteria to become a “qualified entity” will be determined by each Member
State, and only qualified entities would be allowed to bring representative
actions.126 Qualified entities may also seek different remedies within one
representative action, although the Proposal states that punitive damages should be
avoided.127 It also specifically states that it does not replace existing collective
redress mechanisms where they exist within some Member States.128
At the same time, the Directive provides that litigation funding mechanisms
must be fully transparent.129 As noted above, class action funding is sometimes
controversial in the U.S., which allows for “contingency fee” funding.
Furthermore, the Proposal states that consumers should be informed of any ongoing
representative action so that they can learn what they need to do if the action
concerns them.130 Additionally, the Proposal seemingly borrows from class action
procedures in the U.S. and elsewhere by providing that qualified entities have power
to seek discovery from traders when they hold exclusive information that is

COM (2018) 184 final (Nov. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Commission Proposal for the Protection of the
Collective Interests of Consumers].
121. Id. at 8. (Chapter 1 of the Directive lays out the subject matter, scope, and definitions. Chapter
2, article four declares that a qualified entity must (1) meet its Member State’s criteria, (2) have a
legitimate interest in ensuring Union Law covered by the Directive is complied with, and (3) be non–
profit. Articles 5 and 6 states that consumers may obtain injunctions to infringements and appropriate
redress measures).
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id. at 4.
124. Id. at 18.
125. Id. at 19.
126. Commission Proposal for the Protection of the Collective Interests of Consumers, supra note
120, at 20.
127. Id. at 21.
128. Id. at 22.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 23.
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necessary for a qualified entity’s case.131 For efficiency, one qualified entity may
represent multiple qualified entities from different Member States in the same
representative action.132
Again, this Proposal has not yet been adopted or implemented. Furthermore,
it is undetermined how exactly the Proposal would work within each Member State.
Indeed, it is quite unclear how the “qualified entity” requirement will work to
prevent “frivolous actions.” On the one hand, it may be overly restrictive in
preventing law firms to act as “private attorneys general” as they do in the U.S. per
FRCP 23. On the other hand, however, some question whether the “qualified
entity” requirement will become pro forma and give way to arguably abusive
litigation.
Additional critiques and concerns have emerged regarding the notice and proof
of damage provisions of the E.U. Proposal. For example, commentators note that
the Proposal specifies that qualified entities would be able to seek injunctions
without having “to obtain the mandate of the individual consumers concerned or
provide proof of actual loss or damage on the part of the consumers concerned or
of intention or negligence on the part of the trader.”133 Additionally, Member States
may not be required to comply with strict notice requirements where “consumers
have suffered a small amount of loss and it would be disproportionate to distribute
the redress to them.”134 This means that E.U. consumers may be represented by
“qualified entities” regardless of the consumers’ knowledge or consent to the
action—and possibly without any proof of damage.
Funding “transparency” rules are also quite unclear. Third party funding is
growing in importance in the E.U., as third–party funders may essentially “front”
the costs of litigation–a practice that could be seen as “betting” on lawsuits in the
U.S. The Proposal seems to require that qualified entities leading representative
actions must be “not for profit,” but it is not clear whether this operating status
would have an impact on the ability of these entities to seek and recover significant
fees in the prosecution of these actions.135 As for costs, the Proposal would not
impact national rules regarding cost allocation, and there is some question whether
forum shopping would ensue.136 It may be that the Proposal would work in much
the same way as the collective redress law that Germany implemented in November
2018.137 Of course, Member States may go beyond the Proposal, as has been
suggested in Italy, to cover more infringements and larger classes of people.138

131. Id. at 23.
132. Commission Proposal for the Protection of the Collective Interests of Consumers, supra note
120, at 27.
133. Id. at 28.
134. Id. at 29.
135. See generally id.
136. Kevin M. LaCroix, Proposal for E.U. Collective Redress Mechanism Advances, THE D&O DIARY
(June 17, 2019), https://www.dandodiary.com/2019/06/articles/class-action-litigation-2/proposal-for-eu-collective-redress-mechanism-advances/.
137. Anna Masser, Commentary, Collective Redress in Europe: Comparing the European and German
Framework, JONES DAY (May 2019), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/05/collectiveredress-in-europe.
138. Anna Masser, Commentary, Italy to Overhaul Class Actions, JONES DAY (July 8, 2019),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/07/italy-to-overhaul-class-actions?RSS=true.
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Overall, it remains unclear whether the E.U. Proposal would provide adequate
means for consumers to pursue small dollar claims.139 There is risk that the
Proposal would welcome problematic attributes similar to the often–criticized U.S.
class action regime. Furthermore, the lack of consistent application in different
Member States is likely to leave consumers with the same “patchwork problems”
that currently exist.140 Indeed, the problem is that consumers in different countries
get different deals, even when facing the same deceptive practices. We saw this
with respect to Dieselgate. Accordingly, it is time to be creative in devising a global
system for consumer redress with respect to deceptive trade practices and mass
product claims.

IV. EMPOWERING CONSUMERS
THROUGH ODR
Class and representative actions remain an important procedural mechanism
for pursuing mass claims where many consumers have suffered the same harm.
However, class actions are also subject to criticism and are unavailable for many
consumers due to limitations per FRCP 23 or arbitration clauses embedded in
consumer contracts. The prior Sections added to this complex picture through a
comparative lens of class procedures from the U.S. vs. E.U. perspective. This also
showed how consumers from every corner of the world may suffer similar harms
but receive different redress, as in the Dieselgate case. At the same time, technology
has given rise to ODR to expand access to remedies for consumer claims, especially
lower–dollar claims.141 This is because ODR makes it possible to obtain remedies
without the cost and time involved in typical litigation. Accordingly, this Section
will explore how ODR partially addresses the class action conundrum by providing
an alternative to class actions for obtaining remedies on small dollar claims.
Additionally, ODR could help serve the “private attorney general” function of class
actions by providing a platform for reporting mass claims and shedding light on
improprieties in an efficient manner.

A. Benefits of ODR for B2C Claims
Technology has revolutionized how we interact and what we expect in terms
of access to information, assistance, and even redress. It is common to go online to
review and research products. Therefore, it is no surprise that consumers expect to
access remedies online. These expectations gave birth to ODR, which includes use
of technology and computer–mediated–communication (“CMC)” to facilitate
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and other means of dispute resolution.142

139. Roderick Nieuwmeyer, E.U. ‘New Deal for Consumers’ is Coming, CMS (June 20, 2019),
https://cms.law/en/nld/publication/eu-new-deal-for-consumers-is-coming.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Amy J. Schmitz, There’s an “App” for That: Developing Online Dispute Resolution to Empower
Economic Development, 32 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–45 (2018).
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Many within the field are recognizing that ODR has enormous potential to
resolve disputes faster and cheaper than traditional court processes.143 Furthermore,
ODR originally showed promise in typical B2C cases that involve low dollar
amounts and fairly simple facts.144 The web–based platforms also curb delays,
eliminate travel costs, and generally aim to improve the accessibility of justice on
consumer claims.145 Indeed, there have been rumblings for some time that ODR
could largely replace the need for class actions by moving low–dollar, high volume
claims online.146
The early example of private ODR in the U.S. has been eBay’s Resolution
Center, which processes consumer claims related to website purchases free of
charge.147 For example, when a buyer does not receive an item or the item is not as
promised on eBay, the buyer has the right to file an online complaint within thirty
days after the latest estimated delivery date.148 The seller then has three business
days to respond in the Resolution Center.149 If the seller does not respond or provide
an adequate remedy, the buyer may ask eBay to assign an ODR neutral to
arbitrate.150 If necessary, eBay may enforce ODR determinations via PayPal,
eBay’s payment system provider, by setting aside a seller’s funds.151
Since the launch (and success) of eBay’s Resolution Center, ODR has
expanded into the courts.152 ODR may include a range of facilitative processes, but
ODR in the courts has had special resonance with respect to small claims and other
areas where individuals often lack legal representation.153 In simple B2C small
claims cases, for example, claimants often want a quick “click–n–settle” or online
negotiation process that eliminates the need for travel or time off of work.154
Furthermore, online “wizards” that help lead claimants through a process make it
easy for self–represented litigants to fill out and file standard forms.155 Online
processes also allow for easy uploads of evidentiary documentation to obtain timely

143. Peter Cashman & Eliza Ginnivan, Digital Justice: Online Resolution of Minor Civil Disputes and
the Use of Digital Technology in Complex Litigation and Class Actions, 19 MACQUARIE L. J. 39, 42
(2019).
144. Id. at 41.
145. Id. at 42.
146. Id. at 63.
147. Colin Rule, Making Peace on eBay: Resolving Disputes in the World’s Largest Marketplace,
ACRESOLUTION: THE QUARTERLY MAG. OF THE ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOL. (Fall 2008).
148. Id.
149. eBay Money Back Guarantee Policy, EBAY, https://www.ebay.com.au/help/policies/ebay-moneyback-guarantee-policy/ebay-money-back-guarantee-policy?id=4210 (last visited Feb. 17, 2019)
150. Id.
151. Id. (also giving both parties thirty days to appeal any determinations). See also Amy J. Schmitz,
Remedy Realities in Business to Consumer Contracting, 58 ARIZONA L. REV. 213 (2016).
152. Amy J. Schmitz, Expanding Access to Remedies through E–Court Initiatives, 67 BUFFALO L. REV.
89, 104 (2019).
153. Id. at 93 (as noted in the cited article, there is a distinction between “e–courts” and “ODR.”
However, full discussion of the distinctions warrants another paper, and thus this Article will leave full
discussion to another day).
154. Id. at 98 (the benefit of nimble ODR processes is that they allow system designers to “fit the forum
to the fuss” and create a process best suited for the context).
155. See Philippe Gilliéron, From Face–to–Face to Screen–to–Screen: Real Hope or True Fallacy?,
23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 301, 307–15 (2008) (noting use for consumer small claims); Public
Roundtable on Dispute Resolution for Online Business–to–Consumer Contracts, 66 Fed. Reg. 7491 (Jan.
23, 2001); Public Workshop: Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Transactions in the
Borderless Online Marketplace, 65 Fed. Reg. 18,032 (Feb. 16, 2000).
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resolutions.156 Moreover, translation programs give ODR the advantage of allowing
for multilingual processes and communications.157
Utah, to offer just one example, has implemented an ODR program for small
claims cases statewide.158 The ODR Steering Committee was formed by the Utah
Judicial Council in June 2016 to create means for improving access to remedies in
small claims cases.159 The ODR program follows a stepped process, beginning with
“Education and Evaluation,” which is a sort of “wizard” that provides information
about the users’ claims and possible defenses.160 The second step opens a chat
function on the site to allow parties to communicate about their dispute and
potentially negotiate a settlement.161 Parties who reach resolutions can then file
their settlements online.162 If parties are unable to negotiate a settlement on their
own, they move to the third step of the process in which a facilitator helps mediate
the dispute.163 If parties are unable to reach resolutions within thirty–five days, they
move to the fourth stage, in which a trial is arranged either online or in person.164
ODR also is expanding access to court in other countries. For example, Canada
has been an ODR leader in developing its Civil Resolution Tribunal (“CRT”) for
resolving small claims in British Columbia.165 The CRT process follows a stepped
ODR process similar to that in Utah. It therefore begins with a problem–solving
wizard that helps complainants assess their problem and decide the best option for
how to proceed in solving the issue.166 The wizard walks the complainant through
a series of questions and provides guidance on likely options. If the user cannot
resolve the issue through the wizard, then the process moves to an ODR portal,
which begins with party–to–party negotiation and moves to mediation if that
fails.167 In the event that the parties are still unable to reach a mutually agreeable
156. See, e.g., Deliver Fast and Fair Online Dispute Resolution, TYLER TECHNOLOGIES,
https://www.tylertech.com/products/modria (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
157. Melissa Conley Tyler, 115 and Counting: The State of ODR 2004, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD
ANNUAL FORUM ON ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2004) (noting that as early as 2004, eleven percent
of ODR providers had multilingual capabilities).
158. Melisse Stiglich, Utah Online Dispute Resolution Pilot Project, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 3 (Dec.
2017), https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwii9Z
Kj3KboAhVBHM0KHQSYBoYQFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fncsc.contentdm.oclc.org
%2Fdigital%2Fapi%2Fcollection%2Fadr%2Fid%2F63%2Fdownload&usg=AOvVaw1UtJw6b_kAnG
4ZBBnaVikO.
159. Id. at 6–7.
160. Id. at 8–9.
161. Id. at 8, 10–11.
162. Id. at 11.
163. Id.
164. Stiglich, supra note 158, at 11.
165. The Civil Resolution Tribunal and Strata Disputes, GOV’T OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (May 31, 2017),
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/housing-tenancy/strata-housing/resolving-disputes/the-civil-resolut
ion-tribunal (furthermore, jurisdiction will expand significantly in 2019, as it will be able to resolve
“accident claims” for personal injuries arising out of vehicle accidents occurring after April 1, 2019.
Accident claims includes liability claims up to $50,000, as well as determinations whether injury is a
“minor injury” and therefore subject to a cap on pain and suffering damages. This will also include
disputes over accident benefits, such as medical and income benefits that insured British Columbians are
entitled to, regardless of fault). Insurance (Vehicle) Amendment Act, B.C. 2018, b 20 (Can.); Civil
Resolution Tribunal Amendment Act, 2018 B.C. b 22 (Can.).
166. The CRT Process, CIVIL RESOLUTION TRIBUNAL, https://civilresolutionbc.ca/tribunal-process/
(last visited Feb. 17, 2020).
167. The Civil Resolution Tribunal and Strata Disputes, GOV’T OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, http://www
2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/housing-tenancy/strata-housing/resolving-disputes/the-civil-resolution-tribun
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solution, an online adjudicator will make the ultimate decision following online or
telephonic hearings.168 Parties can access the portal on computers or mobile phones,
with telephone or in–person hearings in rare cases.169
At the same time, the E.U. has incentivized development of ODR through its
Regulation noted in the Introduction. The Regulation works in tandem with the
ADR Directive to create an ODR platform, or single point of entry, for consumers
and traders seeking to resolve disputes regarding online transactions through
ADR/ODR.170 Early reports suggest that the E.U. Portal has not gained great steam,
mainly due to lack of awareness and different Member State implementations.171
However, the appetite for using technology to resolve consumer disputes seems to
be growing, and the platform has improved by integrating multiple languages and
auto–translation.172 Of the 24,000 cases submitted in its first year, 44% were
resolved in the negotiation stage.173 With the passing of the New Deal for
Consumers policy in April 2018, more ODR processes are expected to roll out in
Europe.174
Accordingly, momentum is building toward using ODR to expand access to
remedies. Furthermore, this use of technology has particular resonance for these
small dollar and less complex B2C claims, especially because consumers usually
do not think about these problems as being “legal” in nature.175 Consumers usually
want easy access to assistance without needing to consult lawyers or physically go
to court.176 This creates a favorable environment for class actions, as consumers
may obtain remedies by simply failing to “opt out” of a process usually instigated
by class action attorneys (with the help of a lead plaintiff). However, the consumer
may not get full redress, it may take years for the class action payment to come, and
the lawyers may ultimately reap the greatest rewards. ODR, in contrast, allows for
a more “self–empowerment” route to a remedy, which may be more satisfying in
some cases for many consumers.
The time is ripe to look beyond collective or representative actions as the only
viable means for obtaining remedies on small–dollar claims. Class actions should
maintain a role in the larger universe of procedural vehicles for enforcing consumer
protections. Yet, they need not be the only means, and may not even be the best for
all cases or all consumers. Indeed, ODR may open a much–needed virtual door to
al (last visited Feb. 17, 2020); see also CIVIL RESOLUTION TRIBUNAL, https://civilresolutionbc.ca (last
visited Feb. 17, 2020).
168. Id. (these decision makers are independent decision makers appointed by government for fixed
terms).
169. Id.
170. Commission Regulation 524/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 165/2) 18 (although the ADR Directive suggests
that consumers’ access to ADR/ODR should be free or low cost, it does not specify who will fund
developing and maintaining the platform or related services); Council Directive 2013/11, 2013 O.J. (L
165/67) 41 (E.U.) (instead, it encourages private funding and leaves utilization of public funds to member
states’ discretion).
171. Council Directive 2013/11, 2013 O.J. (L 165/63) 6 (E.U.).
172. Cashman & Ginnivan, supra note 143, at 47.
173. Id. at 48.
174. Id.
175. Amy J. Schmitz, Building Bridges to Remedies for Consumers in International eConflicts, 34 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 779, 787–88 (2012) [hereinafter Schmitz, Building Bridges]; Amy J.
Schmitz, “Drive–Thru” Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering Consumers through Regulated
ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 178, 185 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitz, Drive–Thru].
176. See Jean Braucher, An Informal Model of Consumer Product Warranty Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV.
1405, 1410 (1985).
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consumer remedies on a global level, without the “baggage” attached to discussions
around class actions.

B. Establishing a Trusted Platform
With this backdrop, it seems logical that international efforts would lead to
development of a unified ODR system for mass consumer complaints. Government
agencies could work with consumer groups and private providers to set up a portal
that allows consumers to file claims for free or for a very low fee.177 Government
regulators such as the FTC and CFPB in the U.S. could also work with their
international counterparts to educate the public about this ODR platform and
establish a government–approved Trustmark that companies could post if they
abide by the ODR portal and comply with resulting settlements and judgements.178
Of course, developing and adopting a global ODR system is not that easy. The
demise of UNCITRAL Working Group III, noted above, makes that very clear.179
However, the talks broke down mainly due to a difference of opinion regarding
enforcement of pre–dispute arbitration clauses and the inclusion of binding
arbitration procedures through the online process. This became known as the debate
between Track 1 and Track 2.180 The United States favored Track 1 because it
allowed for enforcement of pre–dispute arbitration agreements, whereas the E.U.
Member States and other countries championed Track 2 because it did not allow for
such binding procedures.181 Furthermore, debates regarding the feasibility of a
global chargeback system muddied discussions due to variations in payment
systems and related complexities.182 Nonetheless, it was understood that a global
system for ODR would be beneficial for companies and consumers.183
Accordingly, it seems that renewed discussions with a refined focus on mass
B2C claims, without the distractions of chargeback or arbitration debates, could be
successful.184 Again, consumers seek quick redress and do not have the time or
money for a lengthy process which also requires them to seek enforcement for any
reward obtained.185 The hope remains that leaders from around the world will
continue to discuss ideas and finally bring a global ODR system to fruition.186

177. AMY J. SCHMITZ & COLIN RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE
FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION (2017) (setting forth specifics regarding ideas for a global ODR
system). In the U.S., the CFPB could perhaps lend a helping hand in establishing such a system by
adding an ODR feature to its “complaints” portal. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Arbitration Study:
Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §
1028(a) (2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress2015.pdf.
178. “Trustmarks” are indications that something is “approved” by an official entity of some kind. For
example, the Better Business Bureau’s rating of a company has been called a Trustmark.
179. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, supra note 21.
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id. at 4.
182. The author was an appointed expert to the Working Group for a meeting during this time.
183. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law on the Work of its Thirty–Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.140 (2015) [hereinafter U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law].
184. See Mirèze Philippe, ODR Redress System for Consumer Disputes: Clarifications, UNCITRAL
Works & E.U. Regulation on ODR, 1 INT’L J. ONLINE DISP. RESOL. 57, 68 (2014).
185. Id. at 67.
186. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, supra note 183.
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The first step would be to bring together international leaders to begin the
process of creating and maintaining the global ODR platform. This could involve
meetings among consumer protection agencies interested in contributing toward the
cost of establishing a system, particularly because the system would further their
efforts with relatively minimal costs. It is expensive and inefficient for individual
agencies to each launch their own actions. In contrast, a collectively created ODR
platform would allow for economies of scale and give individuals power to seek
redress without need for direct representation by an agency or law firm, in most
cases. As a result, consumer protection agencies would have to do less “work” in
launching actions on consumers’ behalf, as consumers would have the power to
seek their own remedies without the cost and time of traditional litigation.
Additionally, companies may be inclined to contribute a small fee toward the
maintenance of this ODR platform if the fee would earn the right to post a
“Trustmark” indicating that the business abides by the new system. This
“Trustmark” would benefit the companies by attracting customers.187 Buyers feel
more comfortable purchasing from cross–border merchants when they know that
they can get a remedy if there are problems with the purchase. For example,
companies like Amazon and eBay have enjoyed financial benefits from their
investment in ODR.188 Providing means for a remedy builds goodwill, which is
usually any retailers’ best asset.189 EBay learned that consumers who had
complaints that were quickly resolved were actually more loyal than those who
never had complaints.190
Again, there is no question that establishing a global ODR platform or
mechanism is not an easy task. If it were, UNCITRAL Working Group III would
have done the job. However, all hope is not lost; momentum toward ODR is
growing, especially with respect to small B2C claims. It seems that consumer
protection agencies from around the globe should join forces to create a
contextually tailored system that “fits the forum to the fuss” with respect to B2C
claims. Consumers would benefit from access to remedies through simple and
streamlined procedures, while companies would benefit from an internationally
accepted Trustmark system for ODR that would help consumers feel comfortable
purchasing from companies who provide ethical and fair ODR.191 The following
187. Steven J. Cole & Charles I. Underhill, Fifteen Years of ODR Experience: The BBB Online
Reliability Trust Mark Program, 43 UCC L. J. 443, 446 (2010) (this could mimic BBB’s “trust mark”
program).
188. See, e.g., Rule, supra note 147, at 1; Louis F. Del Duca, Colin Rule, & Kathryn Rimpfel, eBay’s
De Facto Low Value High Volume Resolution Process: Lessons and Best Practices for ODR Systems
Designers, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 204 (2014); Colin Rule & Harpreet Singh, ODR and Online
Reputation Systems: Maintaining Trust and Accuracy Through Effective Redress, in ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THEORY & PRACTICE: A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 163,
175–84 (Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Ethan Katsh, & Daniel Rainey eds., 2012).
189. Rob Enderle, eBay vs. Amazon: An Interesting Lesson in Customer Care, IT BUS. EDGE (Jan. 19,
2012), https://www.itbusinessedge.com/cm/blogs/enderle/ebay-vs-amazon-an-interesting-lesson-in-cus
tomer-care/?cs=49557; RESOLUTION CTR., EBAY, https://resolutioncenter.ebay.com (last visited Feb. 18,
2020); DISPUTING TRANSACTIONS, AMAZON, https://pay.amazon.com/us/help/201754740 (last visited
Feb. 18, 2020); BUYER DISPUTE PROGRAM, AMAZON, https://pay.amazon.com/us/help/201751580 (last
visited Feb. 18, 2020); RESOLVING DISPUTES, CLAIMS, & CHARGEBACKS, PAYPAL, https://www.paypa
l.com/us/webapps/mpp/security/resolve-disputes (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
190. Tibbett L. Speer, They Complain Because They Care, 18 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 13 (May 1, 1996)
(noting “grousers are likely to remain loyal” if they are happy with resolution of their complaints); see
also Del Duca, supra note 188.
191. Schmitz, supra note 142, at 42.
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Subsections add further thoughts on security, fairness, accessibility, and
transparency for such an ODR process.

C. Ensuring Security and Privacy
Privacy and security are top of mind when it comes to ODR.192 Consumers
will not trust a process that fails to safeguard their information, or worse yet, allows
companies to profit from information shared. Indeed, the E.U. has been more
proactive than the U.S. in protecting privacy through the General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”), which has been called “the most important change in data
privacy regulation in 20 years.”193 The GDPR was implemented in May 2018 and
governs how companies safeguard the personal data of E.U. citizens. 194 Unlike
other E.U. Directives, Member States must uniformly interpret and apply this
Regulation.195
Accordingly, the GDPR has had sweeping effects on privacy and security of
consumer data in the E.U. because it creates consistent regulations and avoids
differences among countries. Furthermore, “any company that markets goods or
services to E.U. residents, regardless of its location, is subject to the regulation.”196
This means that companies in the U.S., and all over the world, must comply with
the GDPR when selling to E.U. citizens.197 Accordingly, any ODR platform should
comply with the GDPR at a minimum.
Specifically, the GDPR requires that consent be clear, intelligible, and in plain
language for companies to place “cookies” on their websites and use consumers’
data.198 The ODR platform must therefore make any “cookies” known. It also must
have mechanisms in place for notifying users of any data–breaches and establishing
fines for any companies found to have caused a breach.199 The GDPR sets greater
fines for non–compliance—up to four percent of global turnover or twenty–million
Euro, whichever is greater—that should significantly decrease misuse of consumer
data.200 ODR regulations could add additional “teeth” to these fines by requiring
that companies lose the privilege to use the platform or post the newly established
ODR Trustmark if found to have been negligent in guarding consumer data.
Additionally, the E.U. has recognized the importance of privacy and security
in its ADR Directive and ODR Regulation in that it requires Member States to
ensure that ADR entities make publicly available clear and easily understandable
information on their compliance with Directive standards, including attention to
192. Id. at 42–43.
193. See Juliana De Groot, What is the General Data Protection Regulation? Understanding &
Complying with GDPR Requirements in 2019, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2019), https://digitalguard
ian.com/blog/what-gdpr-general-data-protection-regulation-understanding-and-complying-gdpr-data-p
rotection; What is GDPR, the E.U.’s New Data Protection Law?, GDPR https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
194. De Groot, supra note 193.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Luke Irwin, How the GDPR Affects Cookie Policies, IT GOVERNANCE (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.itgovernance.eu/blog/en/how-the-gdpr-affects-cookie-policies.
199. Art. 34 GDPR, Communication of a Personal Data Breach to the Data Subject, INTERSOFT
CONSULTING, https://gdpr-info.eu/art-34-gdpr/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
200. GDPR Penalties & Fines, IT GOVERNANCE, https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/dpa-and-gdprpenalties (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
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privacy and security.201 “[T]his Directive establishes a set of quality requirements
which apply to all ADR procedures carried out by an ADR entity which has been
notified to the Commission.”202 Furthermore, the Directive requires that designated
competent authorities monitor these ADR procedures in order to advance
consumers’ access to high–quality, secure, effective, and fair out–of–court redress
mechanisms no matter where they reside in the Union.203
Similarly, a global ODR platform must have extremely strict encryption and
security standards and preclude misuse or sale of consumer information. There also
should be regular outside audits of the system, as well as “monitoring” along the
lines of what already exists with respect to the E.U.’s ODR Regulation. The newly
created system’s monitoring should be more centralized and robust, however, to
minimize the consistency problems that currently plague the E.U. platforms.
Again, there are hurdles to overcome in establishing a secure and safe ODR
platform, as evidenced by the demise of UNCITRAL Working Group III.204
However, UNCITRAL Working Group IV recently expressed a desire to consider
the role of ODR in its examination of cloud computing contracts and identity
management.205 Furthermore, ODR has become more sophisticated, user–friendly,
and “mainstream” since 2016. Technologists are also continually creating new
means for ensuring data safety, and there is no reason to believe that ODR would
be less “safe” than any other online process. Let’s face it: consumer data is never
completely safe. Moreover, there is a clear need for global ODR in cases that
transcend boundaries and require international cooperation to protect similarly
situated individuals throughout the world. Imagine if there were a global ODR
platform in the VW case. . . Consumers throughout the world would have been able
to obtain redress more quickly, and do so on equal playing fields. At the same time,
regulators throughout the world would have been able to coordinate their efforts in
detecting and shutting down VW’s deceptive behaviour.

D. Alerting the Public and Promoting
Transparency
As noted above, a key function of class actions is to “shed light” on consumer
protection issues through class notice and attendant press. For example, as
consumers began to join forces against VW, news broke about VW’s manipulation
of emissions testing. If all the consumers in the U.S. were subject to arbitration
clauses in their VW purchase contracts and could not join class actions, then they
may have been pushed into private arbitrations, and the information regarding
VW’s deception may not have become public as quickly. In fact, one of the features
that makes class actions controversial is their power to create “press” that may prod

201. Council Directive 2013/11, art. 7, 2013 O.J. (L 165/73) 1(b) (E.U.).
202. Council Directive 2013/11, 2013 O.J. (L 165/67) 37 (E.U.).
203. Council Directive 2013/11, art. 2, 2013 O.J. (L 165/70) 3 (E.U.).
204. See generally U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, supra note 183.
205. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law on the Work of Its Fifty–Sixth Session, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.IV/936 (2018) (“With respect to section M, the Working Group agreed to add a subsection
on online dispute resolution (ODR) in the light of the relevance and importance of ODR to resolution of
disputes arising from cloud computing transactions and taking into account UNCITRAL’s work in that
area.”).
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companies into large settlements, even when there is not clear liability, simply
because companies fear the bad press.206
Nonetheless, class actions are an important vehicle for promoting
transparency.207 Public trials typically ensure accountability through professional
and media scrutiny, but more importantly, they encourage confidence in the judicial
system.208 In contrast, ODR fails to live up to traditional courts in this regard.209
However, technology provides a democratizing effect by increasing public
participation.210 More people will report claims if they can do so on their mobile
device without time or travel.211 Furthermore, ODR platforms lessen disparity
related to education, experience, and cultural differences by presenting rules and
forms in plain language and incorporating AI to evaluate and direct party claims
toward resolution.212 More importantly, the ease with which user feedback can be
collected online allows for ODR to continually innovate and improve.213 For
example, asynchronous messaging receives positive feedback because it allows
parties more time to compose responses.214 Accordingly, ODR platforms now
incorporate more asynchronous messaging instead of assuming people want
synchronous video or chat features.
Class actions’ transparency should not be overstated because publicity
generally relies on class action attorneys taking on the cases. In other words, a case
must be sufficiently large to be lucrative. In contrast, a global ODR portal for
consumer claims could lead to public awareness and coordinated enforcement
actions through a consumer–led “bottom up” approach. In other words, consumers
would have power to bring claims with little cost, freeing them from relying on a
law firm to take on the case as a class action. Also, if international regulators and
ODR policymakers joined forces to create an ODR portal coupled with a Trustmark,
then companies would be on notice that there is an easy means for consumers to get
redress if the company is caught. This would hopefully inspire good behaviour (or,
at the very least, disincentivize bad behaviour). At the same time, companies that
do not abide by the rules of the ODR portal would not enjoy goodwill generated
from posting the Trustmark. The existence of the Trustmark signals increased
consumer protection.
Additionally, this ODR portal could alert the public and regulators of purchase
problems through inclusion of a “trip wire” that would alert consumers about
recurring claims. In other words, a product or merchant would be “red flagged”
once a certain number of similar claims were filed regarding that product or against
that particular merchant. This red flag could lead to public and regulator notice,
especially where health or safety are at risk. This would promote public awareness
about a danger that may otherwise remain private due to the proliferation of pre–
dispute arbitration clauses and class action waivers in the U.S. It also would
206. Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 446 (2003); Zachary D. Clopton, Class Actions and Executive Power, 92 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 878 (2017).
207. Cashman & Ginnivan, supra note 143, at 55.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 56.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 52.
212. Id. at 61.
213. Cashman & Ginnivan, supra note 143, at 62.
214. Id. at 60.
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augment efficiency by funnelling the most important cases to regulators, saving
them the time and costs of launching broad investigations or remaining in their
territorial silos.
In the VW case, for example, there would have been a worldwide alert of VW’s
deceptive acts as soon as the volume of claims hit a certain level. The level could
be based on a percentage of total sales so that sellers are not disadvantaged by their
volume. For example, it could be set at 10% of sales (or another acceptable
percentage) so that concerns are not raised simply because a merchant sells more
products naturally face more claims. Red flags would only go up after it appears
that there is an inherent product or merchant problem that impacts a large
percentage of a company’s sales.
In the VW case, an ODR “trip wire” would have likely caused alarm more
quickly than the time it took to file lawsuits and launch government actions or
arrange legal representation. At that point, regulators could have immediately
started coordinated enforcement efforts and systems could have been in place for
establishing redress options. Consumers would be empowered to obtain redress on
their own through such a simple online process, which could cut out inefficiencies
and costs that otherwise plague litigation.215
This trip wire idea may not be appealing to companies, as it could arouse
unwanted regulatory action. However, companies could also benefit from the
program if properly conceived. For example, the ODR regulation could provide a
“safe harbor” that would save a company that posts the Trustmark from paying large
regulatory fines, as is otherwise the case with respect to many government
enforcement actions, if the company immediately provides redress and addresses
claims that hit the “trip wire” level. Additionally, as noted above, use of the ODR
process could attract cross–border customers and ease companies’ overall dispute
resolution costs, thereby augmenting revenue and lowering overhead costs.
Compliant, “good guy” merchants would benefit overall by gaining customers and
avoiding costs and bad press of class actions.216

E. Banking on Efficiency
Notably, technology has already gained importance for improving efficiency
of resolving mass claims. Successfully incorporating claims management systems
into the ODR platform would therefore bank on this efficiency, helping curb claims
processing costs and boost consumer pay–outs. At the outset of litigation, online
platforms allow class members to easily sign up or opt out, execute agreements for
representation, upload documents regarding their individual claim, and stay
informed with updates or newsletters.217 Often, attorneys file pleadings, evidence,

215. Of course, these are simply initial thoughts and there are many details for later determination.
E.g., SCHMITZ & RULE, supra note 177 (proposing an online remedy system to expand consumers’ access
to remedies and to revive corporate responsibility in consumer contracting).
216. Another idea for using technology to protect the public from deception is to use blockchain for
tracking goods. Margaret D. Fowler, Linking the Public Benefit to the Corporation: Blockchain as a
Solution for Certification in an Age of “Do–Good” Business, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 881–
917 (2018) (arguing that blockchain could be used to standardize certification requirements and verify
compliance through transparent tracking).
217. Cashman & Ginnivan, supra note 143, at 64.
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and other court documents electronically.218 The volume of documents to be
reviewed in mass claims requires extensive time and money, but online databases
allow the use of key word searches and Boolean operators to find relevant
information faster.219 With the increasing use of predictive coding and AI with
ODR, it is clear that an online system would reduce the document pool and simplify
mass claims resolution.220
Currently, some class action law firms continue with antiquated paper systems.
However, there is a movement toward online claims processing, making it logical
to move claims online from the start.221 For example, the Australian VW class
action involves five named plaintiffs, but if successful, 90,000 other claims will
need to be evaluated.222 Digital technologies can be implemented to expedite
recovery and reduce overall costs.223 Online systems also can help with evaluating
claims on an individual basis in light of proof, injury, causation, and other
substantive legal issues.224 Scholars in Australia have noted how the Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust225 and the Vioxx settlement226 serve as examples of how ODR
technology reduces the time and cost associated with claims processing.227
Shareholder cases also provide an example use case for electronic claims
management. A sophisticated ODR platform can utilize multivariate statistical
methods to determine an inflated price, for example, as well as market factors that
may have had an impact in determining damages with respect to shareholder
claims.228 The Merck settlement229 included an online platform with mathematical
tables, enabling shareholders to calculate their estimated losses.230 Visa and
Mastercard also utilized computer–based processing in their recent settlement for
charging excessive fees.231 Again, technology could be part of the process at the
outset and need not wait until a class action law firm or claims manager decides to
use technology for claims management. ODR from the outset would be
significantly faster and more cost efficient than traditional methods used in class
actions to evaluate and process individual claims.232 Of course, that does not mean
that ODR should be the only door to remedies. Instead, this Article merely suggests
renewed consideration of ODR’s special import for mass consumer claims.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
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Id. at 65.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 77–78.
Id. at 70.
Cashman & Ginnivan, supra note 143, at 78.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 74.
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F. Addressing Accessibility and
Honoring Choice
The rush to digitize has hit breakneck speeds as access to the Internet has
become a basic “necessity” in modern society. At the same time, ODR is gaining
steam as technology becomes a “fourth party” in dispute resolution. Technological
filtering and decision–tree analyses built into ODR help guide individuals through
a resolution process and structure their communications. Technology also may use
predictive analytics to essentially “nudge” parties toward fair settlements.233 ODR
also may ease social pressures of in–person discussions, especially when one fears
how she will be perceived due to race or gender.234 This is why ODR may help
empower marginalized groups who fear stereotypes or biases based on appearance,
voice, or accent.235 Additionally, smartphones have helped democratize the Internet
and narrow the digital divide.236
However, that does not mean that ODR is the answer for everyone and all
disputes. Empathy fostered through in–person communications still plays a role in
dispute resolution. Indeed, some individuals will never feel comfortable seeking
remedies through an online process. That is why in–person remedy systems must
remain accessible. This is especially true for older adults that did not grow up with
the Internet. Indeed, a “digital divide” remains in terms of consumers’ differential
access to and comfort with the Internet. This is most pronounced with respect to
older adults and those with lower levels of education.237
At the same time, policymakers and businesses must consider ways to expand
free or low–cost Internet access for vulnerable groups.238 They also should expand
access to the Internet in rural areas and create places where individuals can go to
use an ODR process with assistance. This may be particularly helpful for older
adults who are overwhelmed with the idea of filing a claim online. For example,
public libraries and senior centers often offer free computer labs, which could
include kiosks for assistance with filing online claims. Additionally, public
facilities, consumer protection agencies, and businesses that use ODR also could
provide “ODR stations” set up with free Wi–Fi access for consumers to file claims
online.
In fact, the Legal Education Foundation (“LEF”) has suggested similar
considerations in the wake of the seeming rush to digitize courts in the U.K. 239 As
the U.K. is closing courthouses and swiftly moving cases online, the LEF has
233. Ayelet Sela, e–Nudging Justice: The Role of Digital Choice Architecture in Online Courts, 2019
J. DISP. RESOL. 127, 127–40 (2019).
234. See Paul Stylianou, Online Dispute Resolution: The Case for a Treaty Between the United States
and the European Union in Resolving Cross–Border E–Commerce Disputes, 36 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L.
& COM. 117, 125 (2008) (recognizing emotion involved with F2F communications).
235. Id. at 125–26.
236. Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, Home Broadband 2013, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/26/home-broadband-2013/.
237. Thom File, Computer & Internet Use in the U.S., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 3 (May 2013),
https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-569.pdf.
238. See, e.g., Rebecca R. Ruiz, F.C.C. Chief Seeks Broadband Plan to Aid the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (May
28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/business/fcc-chief-seeks-broadband-plan-to-aid-thepoor.html (discussing plan to expand access to the internet for the poor).
239. Natalie Byrom, Digital Justice: HMCTS Data Strategy & Delivering Access to Justice Report &
Recommendations, LEGAL EDUC. FOUND. 2–20 (Oct. 2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/go
vernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/835778/DigitalJusticeFINAL.PDF.
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proposed the need for an assisted digital program to help those who lack the digital
skills to engage in the new process, and the continued existence of a reformed paper
channel that is simple and easy to use.240 In other words, all physical doors to the
courthouse should not be closed. Furthermore, it is essential to gather and study
data with respect to ODR programs in order to examine how people are progressing
through the system, when they are leaving, and what their outcomes are. 241 This
approach would allow researchers to monitor for patterns of attrition at different
stages to see if vulnerable persons are receiving different outcomes.242 Again, any
ODR process should adapt and improve based on data. This is a key attribute of
ODR, as the nimbler cousin of traditional in–person dispute resolution procedures.

V. CONCLUSION
Consumer organizations and policymakers logically focused on comparative
analysis of representative, or class action procedures in the wake of Dieselgate.
This helped shed light on consumers’ need for class or other means for accessing
remedies with respect to relatively low dollar claims without the assistance of class
procedures. The discussion also showed how consumers may not receive the same
remedies when they suffer the same harms. This differential access to remedies has
caused some to question why the U.S. consumers obtained remedies against VW
before their European counterparts. This helped fuel the call for collective redress
provisions in the E.U.
However, the comparative conversation also highlighted a “class action
conundrum”: class actions allow consumers to join forces to obtain remedies with
little cost and effort, but they have (rightfully or wrongly) earned a reputation for
padding the pockets of lawyers and forcing companies into possibly unfair
settlements. Of course, that is an oversimplification of the class action debate, but
suffice it to say that class action procedures come with baggage.
Accordingly, the conversation should include consideration of ODR. ODR has
the capacity to empower consumers to obtain remedies without the cost, time, stress,
and other hindrances of individual litigation. This makes it more economical to
assert smaller dollar claims, and “wizards” built into ODR systems often eliminate
need for expensive lawyers. At the same time, a “trip wire” and “Trustmark” could
bolster the ODR process as a consumer protection mechanism that would benefit
consumers, companies, and regulators alike.
Nonetheless, ODR designers must be careful to safeguard privacy and security
and promote accessibility.243 Cost and time savings are important ODR goals, but
they should not overshadow fairness and justice.244 Policymakers must work with
providers in establishing best practices for any international ODR platform and
require companies to abide by these practices in order to enjoy the benefits of
posting a monitored ODR Trustmark. The International Center for Online Dispute
Resolution (“ICODR”) has already articulated principles and standards for ODR
240. Id. at 12.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Scott J. Shackelford & Anjanette H. Raymond, Building the Virtual Courthouse: Ethical
Considerations for Design, Implementation, and Regulation in the World of ODR, 2014 WIS. L. REV.
615, 616 (2014).
244. Id. at 628, 643.
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that should serve as a starting point.245 Moreover, the conversation is growing as
the National Center for Technology and Dispute Resolution, American Bar
Association, National Center for State Courts, PEW Charitable Trust, Cyberjustice
Laboratory, and many more stakeholders continue to discuss how to best design and
assess ODR with a goal toward fair and efficient justice that “fits the forum to the
fuss.”246

245. The following list of ODR Standards is taken directly from the International Council for Online
Dispute Resolution at ICODR Standards, ICODR, http://icodr.org/index.php/standards/ (last visited
Feb. 19, 2020), and were based on the ODR Ethical Principles put forth in Leah Wing, Ethical Principles
for Online Dispute Resolution: A GPS Device for the Field, 3 INT’L J. ON ONLINE DISP. RESOL. 12, 12
(2016). See also Ethical Principles for ODR Initiative, NCTDR (2016), http://odr.info/ethics-and-odr/.
246. See NAT’L CTR. FOR TECH. & DISPUTE RESOLUTION, www.ODR.info (last visited Mar. 18, 2020),
and sources cited therein for more information. See also THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION & THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROT., www.newhandshake.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
This author is also the Co–Chair of the ODR Task Force seeking to set standards for ODR in various
contexts.
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